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Abstract—Price manipulation refers to the act of using illegal
trading behaviour to manually change an equity price with
the aim of making proﬁts. With increasing volumes of trading,
price manipulation can be extremely damaging to the proper
functioning and integrity of capital markets. Effective approaches
for analysing and real-time detection of price manipulation are
yet to be developed. This paper proposes a novel approach,
called Hidden Markov Model with Abnormal States (HMMAS),
which models and detects price manipulation activities. Together
with the wavelet decomposition for features extraction and
Gaussian Mixture Model for Probability Density Function (PDF)
construction, the HMMAS model detects price manipulation
and identiﬁes the type of the detected manipulation. Evaluation
experiments of the model were conducted on six stock tick data
from NASDAQ and London Stock Exchange (LSE). The results
showed that the proposed HMMAS model can effectively detect
price manipulation patterns.
Index Terms—Hidden Markov Model, Anomaly Detection,
Capital Market Price Manipulation
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, new aspects of risk
management have been identiﬁed by regulators around the
world. Surveillance of ﬁnancial exchange markets to prevent
market abuse activities is one of the emerging needs in the
ﬁnancial sector. Financial market abuse can be split into three
general categories. These include information based manipula-
tion, where false information is released to affect equity prices;
action based manipulation, where a person’s actions change the
real value of an asset; and trade based manipulation where a
manipulator attempts to inﬂuence a stock by simply buying and
selling [3]. Trade based market abuse is generally characterized
by price manipulation, where the manipulation targets equity
bid/ask prices only [3]. Most existing literature consists of
empirical studies of the phenomenon and the market response
to the manipulation [6], [10], [11], [13]. Very few address
an analysis of the features of different price manipulation
strategies [2] and corresponding detection approaches.
Intelligent techniques for monitoring trading activities are
required in order to provide early warnings. This could in-
clude identifying unusual patterns within the equity bid/ask
prices in real time, as a pre-cursor to market abuse activities.
This paper proposes a new approach for price manipulations
detection in stock exchange market. In this approach, features
of stock bid/ask price are extracted by wavelet theory and then
modelled by HMMAS based approach.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section
II introduces price manipulation and presents a brief review
of price manipulation detection methods. The analysis of
key patterns and features of typical price manipulations are
discussed in Section III. Section IV presents the proposed
HMMAS approach for detecting market abuse patterns, while
its performance is evaluated in Section V. Finally, Section VI
concludes the paper and discusses potential improvements and
future work.
II. PRICE MANIPULATION AND ITS DETECTION
A. Price Manipulation
In capital markets, limit orders are the instructions to buy
or sell equities. They indicate the trading intention of investors
to buy or sell volumes of a speciﬁc equity at a speciﬁc price.
The trade occurs on eligible orders with matched prices. The
outstanding unmatched limit orders are recorded in the order
books and the highest buy price of those orders determines
the bid while the lowest price the seller is willing to accept
decides the ask. The difference between the bid and ask price
is deﬁned as bid-ask spread.
Price manipulation can be carried out in many forms. The
primary form is called “ramping” (or gouging [5] or momen-
tum ignition [17]), which describes the activities of a broker
who enters a purchase/sell order, usually called “spooﬁng
order” at higher/lower prices to create the appearance of active
interest in a security, followed by an order on the opposite side
of the order book, and subsequently followed by a withdrawal
of the ﬁrst order. Once the ﬁrst purchase/sell order is created,
a price upward/downward movement is expected from the
investor and the latter actions follow only when there is an
enough potential proﬁt for the investor. Ramping has roughly
the same effect as the other two forms of price manipulation,
colloquially known as “pump&dump” and “capping&pegging”
schemes [5]. In both of these cases, exchange participants
make a proﬁt by generating a signiﬁcant increase in price for
a security and carry out a quick ﬂip at the higher price to
remove the already held positions in the former scheme, and to
exercise the held derivative/option of the manipulated security
of the latter. If proﬁt is exploited in another market, the form
of price manipulation is then termed cross order/market.
In September 2012, an analogous type of “Ramping” was
reported and documented by the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority in the USA [12]. In this case, a liquidity-enhancing
strategy, “quote stufﬁng”, was used to create the ﬁctitious
impression of buying interest on the bid side by quickly
submitting and cancelling a mass of fake orders. As discussed
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by NANEX [12], quote stufﬁng is the dominant manipulation
strategy in stock exchanges of Copenhagen, Helsinki, London,
Oslo and Stockholm and NASDAQ (See also in[17]).
All of above mentioned different forms of market abuse
reduce to the same manipulations tactic: artiﬁcially pushing
up/down the price of a security and taking advantage of the
increased/decreased price. Proﬁts are made in distinct ways as
shown in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1: Different types of price manipulation
B. Price Manipulation Detection
The automatic detection of price manipulation has been
less studied in contrast to the volume of theoretical and
empirical work on manipulation activities. Two computational
approaches, logistic regression with artiﬁcial neural network
and support vector machine, have been studied and compared
for their use in detecting trade based manipulation within
the emerging Istanbul Stock Market [13]. Similar work has
been done by modelling the returns, liquidity and volatility
of the equity price using linear and logistic regression [6].
Evaluations and comparisons of different techniques have been
presented [6], [13], but the studies lack any reliable quantitative
analysis of the relationship between the manipulation tactic
and the relevant features like return, trading volume, liquidity
and volatility. An association rule, has been proposed to detect
closing price manipulation in the Thai Bond Market [11].
The approach is based on the assumption that trading time
should be random regardless of the trader. It is stated as a
supplementary to the existing surveillance system within the
Thai Bond Market for identifying a speciﬁc type of trade based
manipulation [11] rather than a general detection approach.
A market close “ramping” detection algorithm developed by
Smarts Group International (a surveillance technique provider),
and applied by NASDAQ OMX is described in [2]. But this
work mainly focuses on the relationship study of the market
efﬁciency and the manipulations detected by the Smarts Group
algorithm rather than the analysis of detection algorithms.
The Smart Group algorithm triggers the alert of market close
“ramping” if the percentage difference between the closing
price and the price 15 minutes prior is greater than a certain
threshold, which is set to a 99% histogram distribution cut-off
of the historical price change during the benchmark period.
The straight forward market proven detection approach from
Smarts Group is the industry benchmark for our study.
Generally speaking, work to date mainly focuses on the
detection of manipulation in pre-recoded datasets according to
assumptions based on empirical studies. To the best of our
knowledge, only limited efforts appear to have been made to
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Fig. 2: Price Manipulation Patterns. (Reproduced based on
data from [17])
carry out in-depth analysis of the strategic behaviour of price
manipulation tactics [2], [10], and very little effort has been
made to develop computational models of price manipulation
strategies. The latter is the focus of this paper.
C. Problem Formulation
According to the price manipulation scenarios, the typical
patterns of bid/ask price ﬂuctuation during a manipulation
process have been reported by Credit Suisse and Nanex and
are illustrated in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 2(a), the successively increasing “non-bona ﬁde” buy
orders pushed the bid price going up from 101.24 to 101.31
and the cancellation of them dropped down it back to the origin
level thus making a sawtooth pattern. The increasing bid lured
a trade to occur before the cancellation. The “sawtooth” is a
typical pattern in bid/ask during “quote stufﬁng” [12] and is
also discovered as manipulation by High Frequency Trading
in [17], [9].
Unlike the “quote stufﬁng” strategy, where the bid price
is increased along a slope, a “ramping” tactic usually enters
one “spooﬁng order” at higher/lower prices to create the
appearance of active interest on bid/ask sides of a security.
Through this, the manipulated price can be moved up/down
a percentage and revert to its previous level . The percentage
of price movement is usually small compared to the long term
price and is illustrated as a small pulse or square ﬂuctuation as
illustrated in Fig. 2(c) [18]. However, it can also be signiﬁcant
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as illustrated in Fig. 2(b). Although this unusual pulse rise
is rare since most exchange markets such as Euronext NSC
suspend continuous trading if prices change by more than 2%
[7], it is also highlighted as one of the typical manipulation
cases in [9].
III. CHARACTERISATION OF PRICE MANIPULATION
The characterisation of irregular price manipulation patterns
is key to their detection. The extraction of reliable features is
crucial to the design of detection algorithms. The price manip-
ulation detection system proposed in this paper is comprised of
a feature extraction component and a detection model, which
is trained based on normal data samples deﬁned by the features
extracted from the equity bid/ask price by the feature extraction
component, which is discussed as the follows.
A. Common Features
Typical price manipulations are usually followed by either a
remarkable bid/ask price change or special patterns (square or
sawtooth) of short term small ﬂuctuations. Correspondingly,
two intuitive features of the manipulation activities can be
extracted:
1) The amplitude of price (bid/ask) ﬂuctuation:
ΔP =
P (t+ 1)− P (t)
P (t+ 1)
(1)
where P (t) is the ask/bid price at time t
2) The rate of price (bid/ask) ﬂuctuation (represented as
ﬁrst order derivative of P (t) with respect to t):
dP (t)
dt
= lim
Δt→0
P (t+Δt)− P (t)
Δt
(2)
where Δt is the time interval between the changes of
ask/bid prices.
B. Additional Features
As illustrated in Fig. 2(a), the “sawtooth” patterns
show mere changes of original equity price (101.31 −
101.24)/101.24 = 0.069%. Similarly, “square” patterns are
around 0.047% changes as illustrated in Fig. 2(c).
According to the capital market microstructure theory,
the nature of the equity price movement follows the mean-
reverting feature, the tendency to randomly oscillate away
from, and over time back towards an “equilibrium” price level
determined by the long-term mean of the equity.
The price ﬂuctuations triggered by the manipulation strate-
gies can be considered as short-termed oscillations with small
amplitudes around the “equilibrium” level of the price (0.069%
in Fig. 2(a) and 0.047% in Fig. 2(c)). Such tiny ﬂuctuations
are usually considered as the “contamination” of ﬁnancial data
[8]. The “noisy” part is where the manipulation patterns occur.
Therefore, retrieving “noisy” short-term oscillation information
from the price is crucial for detecting particular patterns.
The wavelet analysis feature of separating the low and high
frequency components of a signal while localising the high
frequency components in time enables the application in the
ﬁelds of economics and ﬁnance for de-noising ﬁnancial time
series [8]. The power of the wavelet method in analysing
frequency components of a signal and localising components
in time could be utilised for feature extraction.
a) The Wavelet Approach: Signals y(t) can be decom-
posed into a combination of some scaling functions φM,n(t)
and wavelet functions ψm,n(t), each factored by their corre-
sponding approximation coefﬁcients SM,n and detail coefﬁ-
cients Tm,n [1].
y(t) =
∞∑
n=−∞
SM,nφM,n(t) +
M∑
m=−∞
∞∑
n=−∞
Tm,nψm,n(t),
(3)
Once the signal is decomposed, the detail coefﬁcients vectors
can be ﬁltered for processing the signals since it represents
“high-frequency” components of the signal. In our approach,
the traditional “hard thresholding” method used in signal de-
noising [8] is applied inversely, so removing the “equilibrium”
level and keeping the “noisy” short term oscillation informa-
tion is carried out with “hard” thresholding and the wavelet
coefﬁcients outside the thresholds are set to zeros:
Tm,n =
{
=Tm,n if |Tm,n| ≤ λ
=0 if |Tm,n| > λ
(4)
where n is the shift parameter which controls the translation
of the scaling and wavelet functions; λ is the ﬁxed threshold
and Tm,n are the detail coefﬁcients at level m. Based on the
above method, the wavelet procedure consists of the following
steps:
1) Decomposition. For a given data series y(t), cal-
culate the discrete wavelet transform at a certain
level m to obtain the wavelet coefﬁcient vectors
{Tm,n, Tm−1,n, ..., T1,n} and the scaling coefﬁcient vec-
tor Sm,n.
2) Thresholding. Select a threshold λ and ﬁlter the wavelet
coefﬁcient vectors Tm,n, Tm−1,n, ..., T1,n through the
“hard” thresholding. After the thresholding, a set of
ﬁltered wavelet coefﬁcients
{
Tˆm,n, Tˆm−1,n, ..., Tˆ1,n
}
is
produced.
3) Reconstruction. Recompose the yˆ(t) using the ﬁltered
wavelet coefﬁcients
{
Tˆm,n, Tˆm−1,n, ..., Tˆ1,n
}
.
An experiment of the wavelet approach is shown in Fig.
3 (right parts of sub-ﬁgures). The equity price, illustrated
in Fig.3, is ﬁltered by the Symlets wavelet at level 5. The
smoothed “equilibrium” values are removed from the original
price and the short term oscillation is remained.
b) Gradient Approach: As discussed in Section III-A,
the price change rate is signiﬁcant feature during the price ma-
nipulation period. To capture this, the gradient of the original
price and the ﬁltered short term ﬂuctuation are both calculated.
Among the methods for calculating gradients, ﬁnite-difference
is chosen and its central difference form is used for approxi-
mately estimating the ﬁrst-order derivatives of the equity price
time series.
An example of gradients of the ﬁltered short term oscillation
and the equity price are shown in Fig. 3(c) and 3(d) (right parts
of sub-ﬁgures) respectively.
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IV. DETECTION MODEL
In addition to the previously discussed feature extraction
process, the algorithm for detecting the price manipulation
activities comprises two parts: (1)learning the probability
density functions of the extracted features; (2)modelling the
transition probabilities among the states determined by the
learned distributions.
A. Gaussian Mixture Model and Hidden Markov Model
A common approach for modelling the probability density
of an observed variable is to approximate its unknown density
with a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) [4]. A GMM is a
weighted sum of M component Gaussian densities as given
by the equation,
p(x) =
M∑
i=1
wig(x|μi,Σi), (5)
where x is a D−dimension continuous-valued data vector,
wi, i = 1, ...,M , are the mixture weights, and g(x|μi,Σi), i =
1, ...,M, are the component Gaussian densities. Each compo-
nent density is a D−variate Gaussian function of the form,
g(x|μi,Σi) =
exp
{
(−1/2)(x− μi)TΣ−1i (x− μi)
}
(2π)D/2 |Σi|1/2
, (6)
with mean vector μi and covariance matrix Σi. The mixture
weights satisfy the constraint ΣMi=1wi = 1. The extracted
features are ﬁrstly studied by k-means clustering algorithm
for determining the number of components of the probability
density function (PDF), which is then modelled by GMM.
Since the availability of the market manipulation samples
in capital market is much less than that of normal trading
samples, the training dataset contains only normal bid/ask price
information. The threshold setting strategy is borrowed from
the industry benchmark algorithm from Smart Group [2]: the
anomaly threshold is set to the 99% cumulative distribution of
four extracted features of the bid/ask price. This is to identify
the highest and lowest 0.5% frequent values for each feature.
To further capture the temporal dynamics between different
features of the bid/ask time series, a Hidden Markov Model
(HMM) [14] presents an ideal model for analysing time-
series data by a state-based form and modelling the temporal
dynamics among the “hidden” states of the Markov chain
Since the lack of manipulation data, as the approaches
in [19], a HMM model is applied on the normal data only:
the features of normal activities are modelled and the test
cases “against” the model based on the selected threshold are
reported as abnormal. However, two problems arise in this
approach when applied to price manipulation detection. HMM
is usually used to model 1-dimensional time series rather than
the multiple features. Anomaly detection using HMM usually
lacks the ability for recognizing the anomaly type and the
probability density of being that type.
In order to address these challenges, an improved HMM
with abnormal states is developed and presented in the follow-
ing section.
B. Hidden Markov Model with Abnormal States (HMMAS)
For the bid/ask price of an equity with T points, four
features can be extracted as discussed in Section III-B. Let
Ft(t = 1, ..., T ) be the feature vector at the tth point in
time. Based on the previous discussion, the pre-processed four
features at time t are Ft = [F ot , F
og
t , F
s
t , F
sg
t ], which are
described as follows:
1) Movement of the original price: F ot ;
2) Gradient of the of original price: F ogt ;
3) Movement of the short-term ﬂuctuation (ﬁltered by
wavelet): F st ;
4) Gradient of the short-term ﬂuctuation: F sgt ;
As discussed in Section IV-A, the probability density functions
(PDF) of the four features are learned separately by the
Gaussian Mixture Model as described in Equation 5. Changes
in the observation distribution can be detected by testing
which mixture component in the PDF was most likely to
have generated a given value. Each component of the PDF is
designated as a sub-state of one feature. This gives a simpliﬁed
“state view” of time-series data.
To designate “abnormal” states based on this “state view”,
thresholds for “abnormal” regions are set on each learned PDF.
As discussed in Section IV-A, “thresholds for abnormality” are
set at the 99% cumulative distribution cut-off. This heuristic
method is also applied in one-class Support Vector Machine
[15], where the detection boundary is usually set to include
most (for example 99%), but not all, training data to avoid
overﬁtting. Hence, the thresholds for each feature can be
set such that regions within the thresholds are considered
“normal”. By doing this, the cases in the regions outside the
thresholds are not simply assumed to be “abnormalities” but
rather generate “dummy abnormal sub-states” for the Hidden
Markov States (as illustrated in Fig. 4), which were extended
to comprise “anomaly” (“manipulation”) states that can not be
achieved in traditional HMMs.
Fig. 3 shows an example of the PDFs’ illustration of the
four features of the time series data. In Fig. 3(a), the learned
PDF of stock price is composed of three Gaussian distribution
components and the thresholds are set to 0.5% and 99.5%
cumulative probability. Hence, 4 sub-states, which consist of
one “abnormal” sub-state (outside the thresholds) and three
“normal” sub-states, are generated by the 3-component PDF
with the thresholds. Similarly, 2 sub-states (one “abnormal”
and one “normal”) are generated for the other three 1-
component PDFs. The sub-states of four features are then
quantiﬁed and combined as the hidden states of observed
bid/ask price so that 4 ∗ 2 ∗ 2 ∗ 2 = 32 hidden states are
generated.
Only three among the 32 states are considered completely
“normal” since each feature is within the “normal” region. The
other 29 states are considered as “abnormal” since at least
one feature is within the “abnormal” region. The manipulation
types in real-life can be deduced using combinations of the
different “abnormal” states.
According to the discussion in Section II, typical price
manipulation is associated with combinations of different
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Fig. 3: Example of the features learned by GMM. (a) Equity
Price (right) and its PDF (left); (b) Short Term Oscillation
(right) and its PDF (left); (c) Gradient of Short Term Os-
cillation (right) and its PDF (left); (d) Gradient of Original
Equity Price (right) and its PDF (left) (Legend: 1: PDF of
Price; 2: PDF of price oscillation; 3: PDF of gradient of
price; 4: PDF of price oscillation gradient; 5: Threshold;
6: Components of PDF; )
extracted features. The types, “Quote Stufﬁng”, “Momentum
Ignition” and “Gouging” depend on instantaneous sweep of
order books and are essentially associated with signiﬁcant
changes in gradients for short term oscillation and the original
price rather than the large price ﬂuctuation. Additionally,
“Ramping”, “Pump&Dump”, “Capping&Pegging” and “Near
Close” are associated with signiﬁcant changes of the original
price or short term ﬂuctuations but not necessarily with the
gradients. Consequently, the 29 “abnormal” states can be com-
bined into three primary manipulation states, namely: “Quote
Stufﬁng”, “Ramping” and “Other Abnormal”. Abnormal states
where only the gradient features are abnormal fall into the
manipulation state “Quote Stufﬁng” while those where only the
price features are abnormal are “Ramping”. The manipulation
state “Other Abnormal” is associated with cases where all
features are abnormal. By this merging, the 32 states are
further simpliﬁed into a six-state view of the observed bid/ask
price with three normal states and three abnormal states. These
states thus provide a complete spectrum of the bid/ask changes
triggered by different trading behaviours as illustrated in Fig.4.
In summary, the proposed computational model for detect-
ing price manipulation activities is comprised of three parts:
(1) extracting the four features of the bid/ask price using
wavelet and gradient approaches, (2) learning the PDF of the
four features by GMM, and (3) feeding the quantised features
sequence into the HMMAS models.
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Fig. 4: Architecture of HMMAS
V. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
A. Experiment Data
The experiment data includes six representative stocks:
Google, Microsoft and Apple from NASDAQ and ARM, BAR-
CLAYS and Vodafone from LSE. These datasets were chosen
because of their relatively higher trading volumes and more
volatile price ﬂuctuation, which are considered as important
factors that might increase the likelihood of manipulation [10].
This dataset covers tick data over ﬁve trading days (from
11th − 15th June 2012) which consist of more than 2,000,000
time points in total for each stock. The trading data on 11
June 2012, which contains around 400,000 points, is used for
training. The 5-fold cross-validation is used on these 400,000
data points in order to train the detection model. The trading
data between 12th − 15th June 2012 is used for testing.
Due to the lack of the market abuse data, synthetically
generating the abuse patterns is accepted for evaluating the
model. Three typical manipulation patterns as shown in Fig.2,
are synthetically created and injected into the testing datasets
of different stock context making it a mixture of both “normal”
and “abnormal” patterns. For each stock dataset, the model is
tested on ﬁve different testcases n = 1, ..., 5, where testcase
n = 1 contains 10 anomalies for each of the three types
of patterns, thus 3 (types) * 10 (anomalies per type) = 30
total numbers of injected anomalies. Testcase n = 2 has
3∗20 = 60 numbers and testcase n = 3, 4, 5 has 3∗40 = 120,
3 ∗ 80 = 240, and 3 ∗ 100 = 300 total numbers of injected
anomalies respectively. The trained models are then tested on
the mixed test dataset to detect abnormal patterns. This is
practical and acceptable for business people, especially when
it is very costly to obtain real manipulation cases.
B. Performance Metrics
The performance evaluation of the proposed model is based
on the precision (Pre), sensitivity (Sen) and the speciﬁcity (Spe)
metrics which are deﬁned as Pre= TPTP+FP , Sen=
TP
TP+FN and
Spe= TNFP+TN , where TP is the true positive (normal cases
detected as normal), TN is the true negative (manipulation
cases detected as manipulation), FP is the false positive
(manipulation cases detected as normal) and FN is the false
negative (normal cases detected as manipulation).
Two other popular metrics for evaluating the performance
of anomaly detection systems, namely the G-mean and F-
measure, are used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
detection model. The G-mean (G) is deﬁned as G=
√
Sen ∗ Spe
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and the F-measure (F) is deﬁned as F= (1+β
2)∗Sen∗Pre
β2∗Sen+Pre , where
β is usually set to 1 [16].
TABLE I: Sensitivity values of six datasets
Dataset Number of injected novelties30 60 120 240 300
APPLE 0.7692 0.8247 0.8743 0.8660 0.8686
ARM 0.8081 0.8743 0.8815 0.8877 0.8978
BARCLAY 0.7619 0.8602 0.8743 0.8755 0.8791
GOOGLE 0.7692 0.8743 0.8815 0.8803 0.8869
MICROSOFT 0.7921 0.8649 0.8815 0.8889 0.9009
VODAFONE 0.7547 0.8511 0.8767 0.8743 0.8782
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Fig. 5: G-mean and F-measure on six dataset
The experiment results are illustrated in Fig. 5. The best
(i.e. the highest) F-measure and G-mean scores are obtained
on the Microsoft stock price dataset with 3 ∗ 100 = 300
injected anomalies (F=0.947 and G=0.89). The lowest F-
measure and G-mean scores are obtained on Vodafone dataset
with 3 ∗ 10 = 30 injected anomalies (F=0.86 and G=0.796).
Besides the extreme values, the F-measure is generally stable
and within the range [0.9, 0.95]. But the G-mean is relatively
volatile ranging from 0.8 to 0.89. It is notable that the precision
values in all the experiments are as stable as one, which means
no manipulation cases are detected as normal. However, the
sensitivity values varied across different datasets as illustrated
in Table I.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a computational intelligence approach
for price manipulation detection. Price changes caused by
different types of market manipulation were characterised
using the gradient information and multi-level wavelet analysis
of the price data. Based on the extracted features, a Hidden
Markov Model with Abnormal States (HMMAS) was proposed
for detecting the anomalies in the bid and ask prices. The
proposed model was validated on real world ﬁnancial datasets
with synthetically injected anomalies. Performance evaluation
results show that all synthetic price manipulation cases were
successfully detected. However, the sensitivity measure varied
across different datasets which indicates the varied rates of
normal case detected as manipulation and further work is
needed to optimise it.
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